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Abstract 
The Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBE) deploys only 29% of the funds collected from 
its depositors. At the same time a lack of finance for small firms in Eritrea is an 
important obstacle for the development of the country. The paradox of the 
concomitant existence of ample money in the bank and scarcity of money with small 
firm owners can be explained by asymmetric information. Six mechanisms to 
overcome asymmetric information are presented. Interviews revealed that collateral 
was the sole relevant mechanism in reducing asymmetric information in Eritrea and 
that the collateral requirements were high. The other mechanisms had little impact. 
We, moreover, found that the scope of the problem was wider than asymmetric 
information theory suggests. Mutual mistrust, conservatism and rigid credit policies of 
the CBE, a lack of accounting knowledge within small firms, and general 
development related problems did also play a role.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial institutions in Eritrea are involved in an extensive process of 
reconstruction. This also applies to the largest and oldest of the public Eritrean banks: 
the Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBE). The bank is the main source of commercial -
mostly short-term- credit in the country
2. Despite of its dominant position in 
traditional loans, the CBE is not making profits on its main business. The reason for 
this is that the CBE has chronic excess liquidity (Haile, 1999; Sutton, 1995). In 1998 
only 29% of the deposits were extended as loans and advances to customers. This 
means that most of the funds, for which interest is paid to depositors, do not generate 
revenues for the bank.  
At the same time small firms, which are considered to be major actors in the 
economy, are constrained in their growth by a restricted access to credit. According to 
the National Survey (1995), the small firms in the country have financial, marketing, 
transportation, personal and other constraints. Finance is reported as the major barrier 
for start-ups and as the second -after marketing- during normal operations of small 
firms: 43 percent have financial constraints at the start-up and 20 percent face such 
constraints during normal operation. Moreover, according to the study by 
Tesfayohannes (1998), “More than 65 percent of those who applied for a loan, were 
rejected by the bank for lack of adequate collateral and other regulatory reasons, and 
even those who received a loan bitterly complained that they got less than what they 
requested.” 
It is the objective of this article to study the puzzle of why the CBE is 
suffering from an excessive liquidity problem while at the same time the small firms 
in the country are reporting financial constraints as one of their major problems. This 
paper will explore the apparent bottleneck both from the bank's side as well as from 
the perspective of the small firms and by doing so it may contribute to knowledge on 
                                                           
2 Other banks are the Bank of Eritrea, the Housing Bank of Eritrea and the Eritrean Development and 
Investment Bank. The Bank of Eritrea is the central bank and it has the task to supervise the other 
banks and to take care of monetary policy. It, moreover, recommends the interest rates on loans, 
deposits and savings. The process of restructuring, a lack of manpower and absence of a clear line of 
authority, however, lead sometimes to disputes with other banks. The Housing Bank of Eritrea deals 
with housing and infrastructure development projects, and the Eritrean Development and Investment 
Bank’s services are limited to specific sectors and in particular to agricultural and industrial ventures.   
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the credit gap in developing countries. For this reason a model based on asymmetric 
information was used in order to interview several bank and monetary officials as 
well as managers of small enterprises.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 shows that the CBE has excess 
liquidity that hampers its profitability. Section 3 indicates that the bottleneck may be 
caused by information asymmetry. Section 4 discusses mechanisms that reduce the 
problem of information asymmetry. Section 5 describes how these mechanisms may 
work in the Eritrean situation, and discusses what both banks and small firms can do 
to alleviate the credit gap. Section 6, summarises the main findings and presents 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Loans and advances and CBE’s profitability 
 
The excessive liquidity problem of the CBE can be read from Table 1. The table 
shows that since the year of independence the CBE was only able to deploy a 
maximum of 30% of its deposits.  
 
Table 1 Deposits and loans and advances (L&A) (Amounts in million Nakfa at 
the end of each year) 
Year 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Total Deposits (A)  737  1,493  1,951  2,862  3,670  5,101  6,351  7,008 
Total L&A (B)  87  451  321  567  1,112  1,508  1,653  2,008 
Deployed Fund (B/A)  12%  30%  16%  20%  30%  30%  26%  29% 
 Source: CBE’s financial documents  
 
The rate of interest offered on deposits is 7.5% or less, while the interest 
charged on loans and advances ranges between 8% and 12%. Though this interest 
spread may be adequate, it is not enough to compensate for the lack of outstanding 
loans. Therefore the return on assets of the CBE is relatively small as can be seen 
from Table 2.  
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Table 2 Return on assets (ROA) of CBE (Amounts in million Nakfa). 
Year 1992
a 1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 
Average Assets   1,173  2,000  2,982  4,142  5,009  5,868  6,513  3,955 
Interest received  5  40  54  101  140  48  177  95 
Interest paid  12  57  72  85  98  112  135  82 
Provision for 
loan losses 
2  3  12  16  43  43  53  25 
Net other income  35  17  28  43  50  92  51  45 
Net income 
Before tax 
26  -3  -2  43  49  85  40  34 
ROA ( %)  2.3  -0.2  -0.1  1.0  1.0  1.4  0.6  0.9 
a No information is available prior to 1992 on average assets 
Source: CBE’s financial documents and Haile (1999) 
 
Table 2 shows that CBE’s positive return on assets originates primarily from 
other (fee) income mainly from foreign currency transactions and not from interest 
revenues. For most years, the interest received is even smaller than the sum of interest 
paid and the provision for loan losses. Given the relative small amount of loans and 
advances presented in Table 1, it is clear that an increase of loans and advances at the 
prevailing interest rates would increase the profitability of the CBE. The question thus 
arises why the CBE is not (yet) offering more credits to companies that are in need for 
cash. In the corporate finance literature asymmetric information is considered as the 
main reason for discrepancies between supply and demand for credit. For this reason 
we discuss that concept in the next section. 
 
 
3. Information asymmetry 
 
In this section we argue that the reluctance of the CBE to extend credit in general and 
to small firms in particular, may be rooted in the problem of information asymmetry 
between the partners involved in a credit arrangement. This is a major issue in the 
debate on the functioning of financial markets. According to Binks, Ennew and Reed 
(1992), Scholtens (1999) and Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998), access to capital is  
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not only attributable to size, but instead it is the result of problems associated with the 
availability of information through which projects can be evaluated. When the so-
called information asymmetry between lender and borrower is bridged, borrowers can 
improve their access to bank credit. Information asymmetry gives rise to two types of 
problems, namely adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) implies that there are qualitatively different 
types of credit applicants. In contrast with high quality applicants, low quality 
applicants are unable to use the borrowed money for valuable investments and they 
will have a relatively large chance to default on the loan. Banks therefore prefer to 
select high quality applicants and the major way of examining a potential borrower is 
by analysing all available information
3. The selection problem results from the 
behaviour of low quality applicants that presume to submit high quality projects but 
do not forward all relevant negative information. Because many small firms barely 
keep records and do not prepare financial statements and financial plans, banks find it 
difficult to evaluate loan requests of these companies, and to distinguish good from 
bad projects. If there are proportionally many low quality credit applicants with small 
firms, banks might refrain from extending credit to these types of firms. It is even 
possible that banks do not want to offer credit to applicants that are prepared to pay 
high interest rates, because banks may consider that to be a signal of low credit 
quality. In that case credit rationing may take place (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
A second issue related to information asymmetry is moral hazard (Pauly, 
1968). If the concept of moral hazard is applied to a lending/borrowing situation, it 
means that the client to whom a loan has been extended controls the money of the 
bank. In such a case the client may use the money for his or her own interests and not 
consider the stakes of the bank. Banks thus try to monitor their clients as all principals 
do with their agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring, however, requires 
some guarantees that proper information will be provided. But if repayment 
conditions are not fulfilled the client may not be inclined to inform the bank 
adequately. 
                                                           
3 In a competitive situation screening of loan applicants is one of the major instruments to compete. If a 
bank is able to decline loans of future failing clients and another bank would not be able to do so, the 
first bank will have a much larger chance to survive (Leland and Pyle, 1977).   
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The examination of credit applicants as well as the monitoring of existing 
clients is relatively easy if the applicant/client is a large firm. Large firms are usually 
well known and well equipped to provide the relevant information to the bank. Small 
firms are less prominent and are not so much accustomed, and sometimes not even 
able, to provide the required information. Therefore, banks perceive loans to small 
firms as risky. Moreover, investigating the creditworthiness of small firms requires a 
lot of time of bank employees while the loan requests are relatively small. Banks thus 
also consider loans to small firms as expensive. The question then arises how the 
problems of information asymmetry and relatively large costs can be reduced. For 
these reasons we present in the next section various ways in which information 
asymmetry can be reduced. 
 
 
4. Information asymmetry controlling mechanisms 
 
Several mechanisms are available to control information asymmetry (see also: 
Scholtens, 1999). Besides traditional banking instruments as collateral and covenants, 
business relationships, ownership, reputation and human capital can assist in bridging 
the information gap. 
 
Collateral  
Collateral is a powerful tool in bridging the information gap as it reduces the risks 
involved for the bank and, therefore, reduces the importance of the screening process. 
The guarantee provided by collateral allows financial institutions to offer credit on 
favourable terms to small firms even if uncertainty and informational opacity 
characterise the venture. Collateral accommodates both adverse selection and moral 
hazard, as the risk of failure is (partially) taken over by the owner of the asset. The 
high quality borrowers who enter the market can signal their status by their 
willingness to offer appropriate levels of collateral. Furthermore, the control of 
collateral by the banks can provide an incentive to ensure that the borrower will 
perform to the best of its abilities. Small firms however are usually less capital 
intensive, and thus have limited collateral. The literature provides some solutions for 
this problem.  
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According to Von Pischke (1991), collateral could be asset or cash flow based. 
Cash flow lending does not depend on the value of pledged assets, but on expected 
revenues and expenses. Therefore, cash flow lending enables more credit than would 
be possible through strict asset-based lending. Though this system requires detailed 
financial and operational information about the borrower, it may be interesting for 
small firms that lack the necessary assets for collateral.  
Another way of alleviating the collateral problem is grouping. Group lending, 
if applicable in the country culture, not only reduces the costs of screening and 
monitoring credit (per individual), but also reduces the risk of default through the 
joint liability and social pressure involved. Group loans induce interdependence 
between borrowers and, subsequently, group pressure improves the repayment rate 
and access to bank credit may improve for the whole group (Besley and Coate, 1995).  
Finally, governments often establish guarantee schemes to improve small 
firms’ access to bank credit. Though in the past quite a number of these schemes have 
failed (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987), others were successful. For example in developed 
countries like Italy, USA, Japan, and Canada, and in developing countries like India, 
Korea, Paraguay and Cameroon (Levitsky, 1986). 
 
Covenants  
Financial institutions also reduce the information gap with covenants. These are 
intended to give the bank more control and to prevent borrowers from engaging in 
risk-shifting behaviour. By using specific financial ratios and activity restrictions, 
banks limit the firm’s freedom to allocate financial resources and to recover losses 
(Berger and Udell, 1998).  
In practice, however, accounting covenants cannot be effectively imposed on 
small firms that do not have audited financial statements. In these cases, other types of 
covenants can be established, like restrictions on additional borrowings and 
restrictions on changes of ownership. The incorporation of the option to renegotiate 
can also reduce the credit gap (Gorton and Kahn, 1993). Here the bank is supposed to 
be able to track performance and the option gives the right to the bank to change the 
contract. Of course, also the borrower may try (or contractually be allowed) to 
renegotiate the conditions of the loan. The most well known contract that incorporates 
this option is the line of credit. This gives the bank the possibility to monitor the 
borrower closely in order to reduce the risk of default, but it also enables the borrower  
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to prove his or her creditworthiness and to be rewarded with favourable terms of 
credit at future times. 
 
Business relationships  
According to Berger and Udell (1998), lack of business relationships is a basic cause 
for information asymmetry. If the bank is able to construct tight relationships with its 
borrowers, it will more easily be able to classify its clients as well as to monitor and to 
influence their activities. Moreover, if the bank offers other services apart from 
financing, it will be more informed about the clients and the relationship could 
develop mutual trust. Equally the small firms should show their willingness to 
develop a relationship with the bank. They need to keep accounting records to signal 
their profitability and to convince banks of their creditworthiness.   
Though there is a general agreement in the literature that a relationship 
minimises the cost of screening and monitoring, there is a controversy on how this 
gain is shared with the borrowers, and in particular if the bank has monopoly power in 
the market (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The relationship reduces the bank’s risk and 
expected costs, but it also increases its informational monopoly. The latter effect may 
reduce the incentives for the bank to pass part of the cost reductions to the borrower. 
This potential danger should not be overlooked, because the CBE is the largest and 
the only pure commercial bank in Eritrea. 
 
Ownership  
A major issue in the literature concerns the agency problem in corporate finance and 
in particular the separation of ownership and control. However, agency problems 
driven by the separation of owner and manager are often irrelevant for small firms 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Generally, the owner of a small firm has direct control and 
is thus committed to its success. The bank may even have the opportunity to recover 
the loan from the owner’s property in case of failure. Therefore, if the entrepreneur is 
the manager, the possibility of ignoring a contract will be reduced (Scholtens, 1999). 
 
Reputation  
It is more difficult for individual small firms to establish a reputation with the bank. 
Large firms are known, and their investments more visible. For small firms it is 
especially the personal character, the entrepreneurs’ capabilities and a track record  
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that allow the bank to assess the quality of the company. This may influence the 
bank’s decision about a credit application. It is only after approval of a first 
application that it becomes easier for small firms to establish a reputation with the 
bank, as a firm may prove trustworthy when it pays interest punctually and meets 
obligations. 
 
Human capital  
Particularly in developing countries a lack of educated personnel may constrain the 
use of some of the mechanisms discussed. The problem has two sides: the bank needs 
educated personnel that is able to screen and monitor clients, while the small firm 
owners should be able to produce financial accounts in order to provide the bank with 
the requested information.  
 
The various mechanisms that may be applied to overcome the information asymmetry 
problem are summarised in Figure 1. Moreover, several suggestions are made to make 
each of the mechanisms operational.    
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Figure 1 Controlling information asymmetry  
 
 
Reduced information asymmetry 
 
Collateral  
•  Evaluate collateral fairly 
•  Allow cash flows as collateral  
•  Involve government in credit 
guarantee schemes 
 
•  Provide collateral  
•  Search other types of 
collateral 
•  Consider group borrowing 
Banks  Small firms 
            Covenants 
•  Develop workable covenants  
•  Improve covenants with the 
development of a relationship 
•  Introduce lines of credit.  
•  Keep the option to renegotiate 
•  Respect covenants 
•  Work to reduce the 
restrictions from 
covenants.  
Human capital 
Reputation 
Use a company’s reputation in: 
•  credit rating 
•  setting interest rates 
•  Be a trustworthy 
entrepreneur 
•  Care for punctual repayment 
Use personnel that can: 
•  keep records 
•  evaluate investments 
•  find sources of finance 
Use consultants 
Develop  
•  small business expertise 
•  consultancy services 
•  sales promoters 
•  internal promotion and 
rewards systems. 
•  Involve the owner in the 
relationship with the bank.  
 
•  Involve the owner of the 
firm 
•  Evaluate the owner and his 
wealth 
Ownership 
   Business relationships 
•  Generate trust in the bank 
•  Reward a relationship 
•  Approach clients 
cooperatively  
•  Increase advisory services 
•  Try to trust bank employees 
•  Use bank’s advisory services 
•  Give full disclosure 
•  Have frequent contact  
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As shown in Figure 1 both parties, the bank and the borrower, play an important role 
in bridging the information gap. The activities at the left-hand side give suggestions to 
the bank and small firms may use those at the right hand side. The double fat arrows 
signify the interrelationship between the controlling mechanisms. Six of them affect 
each other, and the presence or absence of one affects the need for the others. For 
example, if the parties have a strong business relationship, then the need for collateral 
or covenants will be less, as the information asymmetry between the parties will be 
reduced. In order to verify how information asymmetry influences the distribution of 
credit in Eritrea, several representatives were interviewed. The results of the 
interviews are presented in the next section.  
 
 
5. What creates the credit gap in Eritrea? 
 
From March to May 2000, interviews were held with several bank and monetary 
officials, as well as managers of small enterprises
4. The interviews revealed that 
information asymmetry constrained the disbursement of credit and that collateral was 
the main mechanism used to reduce information asymmetry. The other instruments 
were used only to a limited extent or were not effective at all. We, moreover, found 
that the scope of the problem was wider than the asymmetric information theory 
suggests. We classified the issues, raised during the interviews as follows: problems 
related to collateral and mutual mistrust (Section 5.1), problems related to the bank 
(Section 5.2), problems related to small firms (Section 5.3) and problems related to 
the stage of development (Section 5.4). 
 
5.1 Collateral and mistrust 
We found that two of the mechanisms for controlling asymmetric information played 
a role. These were collateral and business relations, though the latter was not used in a 
positive sense, but negatively, because the relation between the CBE and small firms 
                                                           
4 Interviews were carried out with thirteen small business owners within various industries, six officers 
from the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, two from the national Bank of Eritrea, one from the National 
Chamber of Commerce, one from the Ministry of Finance, and one from the Eritrean Investment and 
Development Bank.  
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can be characterised as a relation of mistrust. Therefore, collateral is by far the major 
instrument used to solve the problem of information asymmetry.  
A drawback of the use of collateral, however, is that it seriously restricts 
access to credit. The bank requires that the collateral consists of buildings, blocked 
credit balance accounts under the bank’s control or trucks. Land cannot be used as 
collateral in Eritrea, as it is state property that cannot be sold or privately owned. The 
bank does not accept potential cash flows, market opportunities or other valuable 
assets of the firm as collateral. Second, the bank requires more than 150 percent 
security on a loan requested. Third, the engineering department of the bank is the only 
authorised agent to value the pledged assets and its value estimations are very 
conservative. According to the interviewed customers, the bank never grants the full 
amount of the loan requested, even if the borrower pledges the required collateral. As 
a counter reaction, many of the clients systematically apply for a higher amount than 
they actually need, and feasibility studies are prepared to fit the amount applied for. 
The upshot is mistrust between the parties and credit allocated on fake feasibility 
plans. 
There are also other reasons why there is a limited willingness from each side 
to build a strong relationship in order to bridge information asymmetry. According to 
a small firm owner "the bank is only concerned with the return of the loan". There is 
not much concern for viability of the firm and for a long-term lending relationship 
with the client. But also firms are not eager to forward all the required information 
and to improve their creditworthiness through keeping applicable management and 
accounting systems. According to one of the credit officers, “the applicants usually do 
not tell their accurate earnings, mainly because they fear taxes. They think the bank 
will reveal their earnings to the Inland Revenue for taxation.” 
 
5.2 Restrictions within the CBE 
The main restrictions within the CBE are related to conservatism and to specific 
policies and requirements. Banks in general are conservative, since they are dealing 
with other people’s money and must be trusted as stable and secured repositories. This 
conservatism, however, affects the management and the staff of the CBE, which is 
trained to adhere rigorously and correctly to rules and procedures.  
One reason that is deterring the bank from acting efficiently and flexibly in the 
credit market is the fact that the client is the major source of information for the credit  
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officers. The bank does not have a special unit studying the small business sector nor 
any other valuable source of information, which could measure the creditworthiness 
of the credit applicant. Since, in general, small firms do not have well-organised 
recording systems either, the information is based mainly on interviews with the 
credit applicant. As this information may be biased the credit officers in the bank are 
conservative when it comes to granting loans.  
Conservatism also comes from the fact that the information exchange between 
the lower level officers who are in a direct contact with the customer and those at the 
higher administrative level is lacking. According to the staff, the transfer of 
information to the higher echelons of the hierarchy is deficient and in general the 
higher administrators do not consult the lower level officers before any decision is 
made. This limits the power of the loan officers and makes the bank inflexible. These 
are serious barriers for a client-oriented atmosphere in the bank.  
The formal requirements set by the bank (Commercial Bank of Eritrea, 1997) 
further constrain credit disbursement. Besides collateral the bank asks for financial 
statements or feasibility studies. These requirements deprive private small companies 
from obtaining bank loans, because the accounting data are not available while 
feasibility studies are expensive. Generally, consultants charge more than four 
thousand Nakfa (about 600 US dollars), depending on the period of the study and the 
complexity of the project. At times these costs represent more than 30 percent of the 
borrowings the small firm owners apply for. Furthermore, the policy of the bank does 
not permit rollovers or extensions of a term loan, which is an obstacle for firms in an 
expansion stage.  
The bank also specifies that the principal responsibility for ensuring 
repayment rests with the branch managers and account officers who recommended 
approval of the loan. No incentives are given for finding and keeping profitable 
contracts. Some of the credit officers in the bank present this problem as an obstacle 
for their creativity and for the development of strong business relationships with the 
clients. They also expressed the general feeling that their work hardly influences the 
final decision about the application.  
Finally, the operations of the CBE in the market do not seem to be driven by 
the costs and benefits of the respective services. Idle cash is not perceived as a cost to 
the bank and the bank seems to be more concerned about the repayment of the loans 
than about profitability. The bank is also not diversifying its offerings in order to use  
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its excessive liquidity and with the conservatism and bureaucratic requirements the 
CBE is far from operating like an ideal venture capitalist (Harris and Bovaird, 1996). 
 
5.3 Restrictions within small firms 
In general small firms in Eritrea do not produce reliable accounts or business plans. 
The absence data can amongst others be attributed to a high illiteracy rate and a 
traditional way of managing companies. The lack of accounting data and sound 
business plans makes the bank insecure about the adequate use of financial resources 
and causes the bank to consider small firms as risky. It also implies that it is difficult 
for firms to make reasonable estimations for their need of finance. Tesfayohannes 
(1998) even indicated that some proprietors tend to overstate the importance of a lack 
of credit as a constraint for further business development and thereby understate the 
importance of their own management weaknesses. A lack of accounting data also 
creates problems when credit is provided, because companies cannot detect losses 
quickly enough to inform the bank on a forthcoming problem.  
According to one of the credit officers, “there is a habit of ‘copying others’ in 
the market. The proprietors copy other businesses (peers or friends) without studying 
the supply and demand in the market and, as a consequence, fail as soon as the 
market becomes saturated.” As an example for this behaviour of small firms, the 
bank officers pointed at the newly opening pastry shops and brick factories in 
Asmara. This copying behaviour has a negative impact on the creditworthiness of the 
whole sector.  
One final point raised by the bank is the lack of real collaboration from the 
small firm side. Though each party is pointing its finger to the other when it comes to 
collaboration, many small firm proprietors do not seem to understand that it would be 
difficult to access bank credit without effective co-operation.  
 
 
5.4 Development related problems  
A major problem for bridging the credit gap is rooted in the weak capacity of human 
resources. As indicated in Figure 1, the availability of human capital may help in 
alleviating asymmetric information problems. In developing countries the general 
expertise is, however, missing. In Eritrea, both the small firms and the CBE are 
suffering from the lack of technical and managerial expertise necessary to produce  
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and screen financial accounts (Tesfayohannes, 1998). As a result, they have limited 
capabilities to implement the instruments that can reduce asymmetric information and 
the credit gap.  
One might also argue that a history of bureaucratic domination and –again- a 
lack of skilled labour may induce developing countries to implement hierarchic and 
bureaucratic organisations (like the CBE). However, these types of organisations may 
not be the best in allocating resources when the information about investment projects 
is “soft” (Stein, 2002). It is therefore not amazing that only collateral as a “hard” fact 
can be processed in the hierarchy and that “soft” information provided by small firm 
owners remains unused. 
Moreover, various public organisations do not (yet) assist in bridging the 
information gap. The government of Eritrea, for example, has been issuing loan 
guarantees to the ex-fighters and refugees. The objective was to help them to cope 
with the new market situation after the war. However, the rate of default was high for 
the loans provided to these groups. Though the government guarantee scheme had 
mainly a social objective, the high number of defaults affected the attitude of bank 
officers, and made them less confident in the repayment capabilities of small firm 
owners in general.  
Other public organisations like the National Bank of Eritrea, National 
Chamber of Commerce, University of Asmara, Eritrean Development and Investment 
Bank could also help to alleviate the credit accessibility problem, but they are not 
involved in providing the services needed. These institutes could assist in the 
production of accounting reports for small firms; they could produce market studies 
and provide bank personnel with the proper knowledge necessary to screen and 
monitor small firms. Despite the fact that the macro-economic policy aims at 
promoting small-scale industries, state owned organisations are not eager to support 
small firms. 
  
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
The Commercial Bank of Eritrea is extending its branch network. Despite this 
development the bank has failed to identify new lending opportunities and to deploy 
the funds collected from depositors. In particular it has failed to play a major role in  
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financing small enterprises. At the same time we observe that the lack of finance is an 
important obstacle for the development of small firms in Eritrea. The paradox of the 
concomitant existence of ample money in a dominant public bank and scarcity with 
small firm owners
5 may be explained by the problem of asymmetric information. We 
discussed six mechanisms to overcome asymmetric information and we studied what 
both the CBE and the small firms could do to reduce the credit gap.  
Interviews revealed that only collateral was relevant in reducing asymmetric 
information and that the collateral requirements were high. The other mechanisms to 
reduce asymmetric information were not used or hampered by mutual mistrust, by 
conservatism and rigid credit policies of the CBE, by the lack of accounting 
knowledge within small firms, and by general development related problems in 
Eritrea. The sole reliance on collateral can in part be explained from the absence of a 
variety of other mechanisms and in part from the fact that it is a mechanism that can 
relatively easily be used in a bureaucratic organisation like the CBE. In contradiction 
to traditional economic views we see here a monopolist that is not concerned with 
making a profit, but with bureaucratic adherence to rules aimed at securing its 
possessions. 
Though we presented here the Eritrean case, we think that the findings may 
have implications for other developing countries. If many of the mechanisms to 
reduce asymmetric information are absent in developing countries, we will find that 
collateral becomes even more important in developing countries than it is in 
developed countries. In that case the credit "gap" may result in a credit "trap". Small 
firms in developing countries do not have much collateral to offer, but neither do they 
have access to the other mechanisms that reduce the credit gap. When collateral is the 
only remaining mechanism, the collateral requirements will become very high and 
many small firms will be destitute of credit. Without the credit, however, the small 
companies will not be able to grow and to accumulate the assets needed for future 
collateral and further growth. This implies that companies without access to credit 
will remain deprived from credit and that the small firms cannot assist in developing 
the country. When small firms, however, are considered relevant for the development 
                                                           
5 Of course some small firm owners may be able to find other sources of financing, like retained 
earnings, family and friends (from the diaspora) and trade credit. Each of these types of financing may 
have its own problems, like limited availability, personal conflicts and lack of trust, and high implicit 
interest rates. For these reasons bank loans remain very important for small firm owners.   
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of a country, the various parties in the country should develop ways in which the 
small firms could escape from such a credit trap.  
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